In Republic v Court of Appeal; Ex parte Laba, the Supreme Court closed the statutorily created gap by recasting the scheme in three clear propositions:
- jurisdiction is (a) conferred by statute; (b) invoked by the notice of appeal; and (c) seised on transmission of the record from the High Court to the Court of Appeal;
- Form 6 therefore marks the end of the High Court's jurisdiction rather than the start of the Court of Appeal's; and
- a refused application, including one for an injunction, may be renewed before the Court of Appeal prior to the transmission of the record.
This article examines whether Laba reconciles its recognition of pre-transmission renewal with earlier authority on seisin and the procedural exercise of appellate power. An omitted decision supports a per incuriam challenge only if its binding holding would have required a different result; tension in reasoning alone is insufficient. The final limb of rule 21 permits filing below for transmission but does not expressly authorise determination before transmission of the record. A wider interpretation therefore requires a separate justification for limited pre-transmission competence; a narrower interpretation offers, at most, a route to later determination and leaves the urgent-relief gap unresolved. The article distinguishes those possibilities, identifies the limits of the precedent-based challenge, and proposes an express amendment governing renewed applications of the kind Laba did.
Keywords: appellate jurisdiction; rule 21 C.I. 19; rule 28 C.I. 19; C.I. 132; Civil Form 6; repeat applications; injunction pending appeal; per incuriam; stare decisis; Ghana
1. Introduction
Ghanaian appellate procedure distinguishes the period between filing a notice of appeal and transmission of the record from the period after transmission, when the appellate court is seised of the whole proceedings. Historically, rule 28 expressly permitted appellate determination of an application refused below during the earlier period. Rule 21 governed applications after transmission and allowed filing in the registry below for onward transmission. The distinction matters: a mechanism for filing is not necessarily authority for determination.
When C.I. 132 revoked rule 28 of C.I. 19 in 2020, the first limb appeared to have been done away with. In Republic v Court of Appeal; Ex parte Ecobank Ghana Ltd (Origin 8 Interested Party),2 and Mochcom Ltd v Cypress Investments Ltd,3 it was held that the practice of renewing refused stay applications survived through the Court of Appeal's inherent jurisdiction.4 Aboubakar v Martins,5 however, said that a notice of appeal "does not grant jurisdiction" and that the Court of Appeal could entertain no application before transmission.6 Ex parte Laba was the Supreme Court's attempt to reconcile these positions and to extend the renewal practice to injunctions.7
The result in Laba addresses a genuine need for protection while the record is being prepared. This article questions the breadth of its reasoning, without assuming that disagreement establishes per incuriam. It asks whether an overlooked binding holding necessarily excludes the limited renewal jurisdiction recognised in Laba, and whether rule 21 independently supplies that jurisdiction. The transmission limb offers a possible procedural channel, but treating it as a complete substitute for revoked rule 28 requires an additional argument about when the appellate court may determine the application.
2. The Rules and Their Lineage
2.1 Rules 21 and 28 of L.I. 218
The modern scheme derives from the Supreme Court Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), which then governed appeals from the High Court. Rule 21 provided:
"After an appeal has been entered and until it has been finally disposed of, the Court shall be seised of the whole of the proceedings as between the parties thereto, and every application therein shall be made to the Court and not to the Court below, but any application may be filed in the Court below for transmission to the Court." [emphasis added]
Rule 28 provided that any application which could be made either to the court below or to the appellate court "shall be made in the first instance to the Court below, but if the court below refuses the application the applicant shall be entitled to have the application determined by the court".
In Ampong v Frempong,8 the Supreme Court of the First Republic explained how the two rules fit together.9 An appeal is entered, or deemed entered, when the registrar of the appellate court receives the record and the documents listed in rule 15(1). At that point "the court below becomes functus officio", and every application must be made to the appellate court, "but any application may be filed in the court below for transmission to the court." For the earlier period, "from the date of filing the notice of appeal and before the appeal is entered", the governing provision was rule 28: the application went first to the court below and, on refusal, the applicant was "entitled to have the application determined by the court".
Two features of this account matter for what follows. First, it treats rule 28, not some freestanding notion of invoked jurisdiction, as the source of the appellate court's power to deal with a refused application before entry. Second, it reads the final limb of rule 21 as a rule about where an application is filed, not about which court decides it. The registry of the court below is a place of filing for an application that the appellate court will determine.
2.2 The Succession to C.I. 19
Rules 21 and 28 of C.I. 19 reproduce their predecessors in substance. The only material change is that the trigger in rule 21 is the transmission of the record from the court below, rather than entry of the appeal by the registrar. In Ex parte Mancell-Egala,10 Ansah JSC said the earlier case law applied once "C.I. 19" was substituted for "L.I. 218" and "after an appeal has been transmitted from the court below" for the old trigger.11 Rule 14 governs transmission, and Civil Form 6 notifies the parties that it has happened. C.I. 132 then revoked rule 28 but left rule 21 untouched. The final limb of rule 21, which allows an application to be filed in the court below for transmission to the Court of Appeal, therefore remains in force.
3. The Settled Line on Seisin
The authorities establish a transmission-based scheme, but their precedential weight and subject matter differ. The majority Supreme Court decisions discussed below must be analysed by reference to their holdings; Court of Appeal decisions and the First Republic decision in Ampong provide historical support rather than equivalent authority binding the present Supreme Court. The cited observation of Kpegah JSC is dissenting and therefore not a binding holding.
- Shardey v Adamtey [1972] 2 GLR 380, CA: once an appeal is entered, the court below is functus officio as to all subsequent proceedings, and the mandatory words of rule 21 send every application to the appellate court.
- Baiden v Ansah [1973] 1 GLR 33: between the lodging of the notice of appeal and entry of the appeal, the trial court may entertain interim applications, especially on execution.
- Amakyie v Ababio [1982–83] 2 GLR 933, CA: the general powers of the Court of Appeal under rule 31 arise when it is seised under rule 21. The operative words "after an appeal has been entered" refer to the point reached after the registrar of the court below has transmitted the record under rule 15.
- Republic v High Court, Ho; Ex parte Evangelical Presbyterian Church of Ghana [1991] 1 GLR 323, SC (majority): although an appeal had been filed, the appeal had not been entered and the record was not ready, so the High Court could still deal with interlocutory matters.
- Republic v Court of Appeal; Ex parte Attorney-General [1997–98] 2 GLR 391 (Kpegah JSC, dissenting): a mere notice of appeal is never entered and given a number, and the applications that rule 21 allows to be filed below for transmission "can only mean applications meant for hearing by the court and not the court below".
- Ex parte Mancell-Egala [2010] SCGLR 374: "once Form 6 has been served on the trial court, that court no longer has jurisdiction over the case" (at 383). Rule 21 anticipated that matters might still be pending below and required the trial court to transfer them.
- Ashanti Goldfields Co Ltd v Africore Ghana Ltd [2013–2014] 1 SCGLR 398 (Date-Bah JSC): under rule 16 of C.I. 16, the Supreme Court's equivalent of rule 21, the appellate court has no jurisdiction over interlocutory matters before transmission unless the application rests on some other basis of jurisdiction. The Court rejected an argument that article 129(4) of the Constitution supplied that basis.
- Nii Kojo Danso II v Executive Secretary, Lands Commission, Civil Appeal No J4/35/2017, 28 November 2018: once the record is transmitted, the Court of Appeal is seised of the whole appeal, and every interlocutory application must be heard by it.
- Nana Kwasi Broni v Kwame Kwakye, 22 February 2017, and Aboubakar v Martins (2025): the Court of Appeal acquires no general competence to hear applications on the filing of the notice of appeal alone.
Ashanti Goldfields is the strongest candidate for an outcome-relevant conflict: it refused a pre-transmission application under the equivalent rule 16,12 where no other jurisdictional basis was established. Crucially, the applicant conceded that the motion was not a repeat application under rule 20 of C.I. 16. Its holding therefore establishes a limit on first-instance applications, not necessarily on renewed applications supported by a distinct legal basis. Its reasoning challenges reliance on constitutional appellate power alone, but extending that holding to Laba requires showing why the renewal distinction cannot sustain a different result.
4. The Gap and the First Response
Under the old scheme, a litigant refused a stay or an injunction by the High Court relied on rule 28 for a second hearing. Its revocation left two possibilities. One was that the right to renew had gone with the rule, so that the applicant must wait for transmission and then apply under rule 21. The other was that the right had never depended on the rule.
Origin 8 and Mochcom took the second view for stays. They held that rule 28 had merely codified an existing practice, that the court below keeps jurisdiction until transmission, and that a refused applicant may renew before the Court of Appeal under its inherent jurisdiction. That characterisation is not easy to reconcile with Ampong, which treated rule 28 as the source of the entitlement ["shall be entitled"]. Ampong, however, is persuasive rather than binding, whereas Origin 8 and Mochcom are decisions of the present Supreme Court.
5. Ex parte Laba
In Laba, the Court of Appeal declined to hear a renewed application for an injunction pending appeal because Form 6 had not issued. The Supreme Court quashed that decision on certiorari. Its reasoning has three steps.
- Jurisdiction is conferred by article 137 of the Constitution and sections 11 and 41 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459), including the power to grant an injunction pending appeal.13
- It is invoked in a particular case by a valid notice of appeal, which rule 9(3) makes the originating process. Dora Boateng v McKeown and Nii Lante Lamptey v R.O. Lamptey were affirmed, and the challenge that they were decided per incuriam was rejected.14
- The Court of Appeal is seised on transmission, which Form 6 records. Form 6 therefore marks the end of the court below's jurisdiction rather than conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal.15
On that footing, the Court held that the renewal practice recognised in Origin 8 and Mochcom extends to injunctions that genuinely preserve the subject matter of the appeal. It drew on Merchant Bank Ghana Ltd v Similar Ways Ltd, article 137(3), Order 25 rule 1(2) of C.I. 47, article 126(2) and rule 7 of C.I. 19 (paras 39–44, 66). Aboubakar and Nana Kwasi Broni were confined to their contexts. Aboubakar concerned a first-instance application, and its broader statements were said to be obiter "if" they were unnecessary to the decision.16
The Court built in safeguards. Its competence arises only after a refusal below, on a genuine renewal of substantially the same application, by a party genuinely prosecuting the appeal, for relief rationally connected to preserving the appeal.17 It also left open how far rule 31 operates before transmission.18
6. Was Laba Decided Per Incuriam?
6.1 The Doctrine
A decision is given per incuriam when it is made without regard to a statutory provision, or to an authority binding on the court, that would have led to a different result.19 The doctrine operates in the context of article 129(3) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court treats its own previous decisions as normally binding but may depart from them "when it appears to it right to do so". All other courts must follow its decisions on questions of law. Under article 136(5), the Court of Appeal is bound by its own decisions, subject to article 129(3). As the interested parties argued in Laba, relying on the case of Republic v High Court (General Jurisdiction '5') Accra, Ex parte The Minister for the Interior and the Comptroller-General of Immigration Service; Ashok Kumar Sivaram (Interested Party),20 a departure must be made expressly. A silent departure leaves lower courts facing two inconsistent lines of Supreme Court authority.
6.2 Authorities That the Judgment Does Not Appear to Address
The judgment does not appear to address Mancell-Egala, Ashanti Goldfields, Ex parte Evangelical Presbyterian Church or Nii Kojo Danso II. Their omission warrants analysis, not an automatic finding of per incuriam. Mancell-Egala and the other transmission authorities support the allocation of proceedings after transmission or the continued role of the court below beforehand; that does not, without more, exclude a concurrent and limited power to determine a refused application. The Ampong–Shardey–Amakyie line supplies historical context, while the dissenting observation discussed in Section 3 cannot establish an overlooked binding rule.
Applying Section 6.1's different-result test, the critical candidate is Ashanti Goldfields. A successful challenge would have to establish that its binding holding excludes pre-transmission determination of a genuine renewal despite the distinct basis recognised in Origin 8, Mochcom and Laba. The concession that the earlier motion was not a repeat application makes that proposition difficult to establish. The present analysis identifies a serious question about the breadth of Laba's invocation reasoning, but does not identify an overlooked binding holding that necessarily required dismissal of the renewed application.
6.3 The Handling of Aboubakar
Laba distinguishes Aboubakar as a first-instance application and confines its broader language accordingly. Whether an express departure was necessary depends on the scope of the earlier ratio: a valid distinction requires no departure, whereas rejection of a binding rule would engage article 129(3). The decisive question is therefore whether the earlier holding governs renewed applications, not whether its language can be read broadly in isolation. Without resolving that question, an assertion that the cases are irreconcilable is premature.
6.4 A Measured Conclusion
The material examined does not establish that Laba was decided per incuriam. It supports a narrower criticism: the judgment would have been more persuasive had it explained its relationship with the transmission authorities and confined invocation reasoning expressly to the renewal context. A different-result challenge remains conditional on demonstrating an overlooked binding holding that defeats that distinction. Section 7 tests a possible textual alternative but does not claim that filing below independently justifies the outcome.
7. The Road Not Taken: The Transmission Limb of Rule 21
7.1 The Text and Its Purpose
The final limb of rule 21 provides that "any application may be filed in the court below for transmission to the Court". The authorities show what it does. It separates where an application is filed from which court hears it. In Mancell-Egala, the Supreme Court held that rule 21 anticipated applications being pending below and that the trial court was "duty bound" to transfer them. Dotse JSC, in the same case, read the limb as meaning that any application filed in the High Court would be transmitted to the Court of Appeal for hearing and determination. Nii Kojo Danso II adds that the registrar's role in relation to the record is "purely administrative".
The registry below thus provides a filing channel for applications falling within rule 21. That administrative role does not determine whether the limb operates before transmission of the record or whether the appellate court can decide an application received early.
7.2 The Proposed Route and Its Jurisdictional Limit
Consider an applicant whose injunction application has been refused below before transmission of the record. Filing a renewed application in the registry below for onward transmission would separate lodging from determination. Articles and statutory provisions conferring appellate remedial powers identify what relief the Court may grant, but do not necessarily settle when it may exercise those powers. Rule 21's filing limb does not expressly replace rule 28's former entitlement to appellate determination after refusal. The proposed route must therefore establish both the permissibility of early filing and an independent basis for early determination.
The transmission-limb approach has potential procedural advantages, but each must be kept distinct from a claim of pre-transmission adjudicative competence.
- It can preserve general seisin as a consequence of transmission of the record, but early determination would require an expressly justified limited exception rather than a claim that seisin is unnecessary.
- A renewal differs from a first-instance application; that distinction must support jurisdiction on its merits, because filing in a different registry cannot by itself cure a jurisdictional objection.
- The text supplies a filing mechanism, not an express power to determine a renewal before transmission; reliance on it alone therefore does not answer the objection that inherent power cannot create jurisdiction.
- The words "any application" describe the breadth of the filing mechanism, but do not independently remove the sentence's temporal trigger or establish authority to hear every form of preservative relief early.
7.3 The Objection from the Trigger in Rule 21
The obvious objection is that the transmission limb sits in a sentence that begins "after the record of appeal has been transmitted". On that reading, the limb operates only once the Court of Appeal is seised and does nothing to fill the earlier period. Ampong read rule 21 of L.I. 218 in that way.
The wider reading treats the final limb as independently permitting transmission of an application before the whole record. Its strongest objection is grammatical and jurisdictional: the limb follows the opening post-transmission condition, and administrative delivery of papers cannot itself confer adjudicative authority. To authorise immediate determination, the wider reading would also have to establish a limited renewal competence despite general seisin remaining tied to transmission of the record. That is a substantive exception requiring legal justification, not merely a filing interpretation; this article does not establish that rule 21 alone supplies it.
On the narrower reading, the limb governs filing for appellate determination once the record has been transmitted. Even if advance lodging is accepted administratively, neither the validity nor any priority of that lodging should be assumed without authority, and it supplies no immediate judicial protection. The urgent-relief gap therefore remains. An express amendment can resolve both timing and competence; until then, the limited renewal jurisdiction recognised in Laba, rather than the filing limb alone, supplies the stated basis for pre-transmission determination.
8. Implications for Practice
Practical guidance must distinguish the renewal competence recognised in Laba from this article's contested interpretation of rule 21. A criticism of the reasoning does not entitle lower courts to disregard the Supreme Court's holding, and no filing route should be represented as validated under both readings without supporting authority.
- For the pre-transmission renewal route recognised in Laba, apply first below: prior refusal is a condition of that route, not proof that every conceivable first-instance application lacks a separate jurisdictional basis.
- Treat filing below for immediate transmission under rule 21 as a contested procedural proposal, not an established substitute for rule 28; seek appropriate directions rather than assume that transmission of the application alone permits its determination.
- Identify the limited renewal competence recognised in Origin 8, Mochcom and Laba as the basis for urgent pre-transmission determination; if advancing the rule 21 argument, address separately its temporal trigger and the source of adjudicative authority.
- Meet Laba's conditions in any event. Exhibit the notice of appeal, the refused application and the ruling. Show that the relief is substantially the same and genuinely preservative. Depose to the steps taken to prosecute the appeal, such as payment for the record.
- Be careful where the decision under appeal is itself a refusal of interlocutory relief. Laba requires that the renewed application must not become a disguised early ruling on the appeal.21
9. A Proposal for Reform
The uncertainty is a product of revoking rule 28 without replacing it. The simplest solution is to amend rule 21 of C.I. 19 by adding a sub-rule along the following lines:
"Where, after the filing of a notice of appeal and before the transmission of the record, the court below has refused an application which may be made either to the court below or to the Court, the applicant may file in the court below a renewed application for transmission to and determination by the Court; and the Registrar of the court below shall transmit it forthwith together with such parts of the record as are necessary for its determination."
This proposed sub-rule would expressly authorise both early transmission and early determination of a refused application. It would preserve transmission of the whole record as the trigger for general seisin, while creating a defined exception for renewal before that point. That exception should be stated openly rather than attributed to the present filing limb by implication. A parallel amendment to rule 16 of C.I. 16 merits consideration, taking account of the existing repeat-application provision in rule 20.
10. Conclusion
Laba addresses a real urgent-relief problem through a limited renewal jurisdiction. Earlier transmission authorities warrant closer reconciliation with its reasoning, but the present analysis does not establish an overlooked binding holding that necessarily required a different outcome. Rule 21's final limb distinguishes filing from determination; it does not expressly establish competence to determine a renewal before transmission of the record. The wider reading remains contested, while the narrower reading leaves the urgent-relief gap unresolved. The clearest reform is an express provision authorising pre-transmission renewal and defining its relationship with general seisin, rather than presenting the existing filing mechanism as a complete remedy.
Notes
- That line runs from Ampong v Frempong [1965] GLR 350 and Shardey v Adamtey and Shardey v Adamtey and Another [Consolidated] [1972] 2 GLR 380 decided on rules 21 and 28 of L.I. 218, through Republic v High Court, Ho; Ex parte Evangelical Presbyterian Church of Ghana [1991] 1 GLR 323, Republic v High Court [Human Rights Division]; Ex parte Mancell-Egala [2010] SCGLR 374 and Nii Kojo Danso II v Executive Secretary, Lands Commission, to Aboubakar v Martins. The Supreme Court applied the same reasoning to its own identically structured rules in Ashanti Goldfields Co Ltd v Africore Ghana Ltd. ↩
- Civil Motion No J5/10/2022, 18 January 2022. ↩
- Civil Appeal No J4/42/2023, 4 June 2024. ↩
- Republic v Court of Appeal; Ex parte Ecobank Ghana Ltd (Origin 8 Interested Party), Civil Motion No J5/10/2022, 18 January 2022; Mochcom Ltd v Cypress Investments Ltd, Civil Appeal No J4/42/2023, 4 June 2024. ↩
- Civil Appeal No J4/54/2023, 19 March 2025. ↩
- Alhaji Halidu Aboubakar v Dinah Afi Martins, Civil Appeal No J4/54/2023, 19 March 2025. ↩
- Republic v Court of Appeal; Ex parte Laba, Civil Motion No J5/67/2026, 28 October 2026. Paragraph references are to the copy of the judgment reviewed. Its numbering repeats paragraphs 80 and 81, and the three propositions appear in the second sequence of paragraphs 80 to 83. ↩
- [1965] GLR 350. ↩
- Ampong v Frempong [1965] GLR 350, SC, at 352 (Mills-Odoi JSC). ↩
- [2010] SCGLR 374. ↩
- Republic v High Court (Human Rights Division), Accra; Ex parte Mancell-Egala (Attorney-General Interested Party) [2010] SCGLR 374 at 390 (Ansah JSC). ↩
- The Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I. 16). ↩
- Para 46. ↩
- Paras 47, 48 and 59. ↩
- Paras 59, 60, 65 and 75. ↩
- Paras 50 to 58. ↩
- Paras 67, 70–71, 74. ↩
- Para 68. ↩
- Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718, CA; Morelle Ltd v Wakeling [1955] 2 QB 379, CA. ↩
- Civil Motion No. J5/10/2018, SC. ↩
- Paras 77–80. ↩